lying along a continuum in terms of their degree of 'ordinariness.' Any attempt to divide the continuum into two groups -ordinary and extraordinary -is faced with the problem of explaining why the line should be drawn in one place rather than another. Given this view, there does not seem to be any non-arbitrary place to draw the line.
A female infant in the newborn centre was diagnosed as having trisomy i8 syndrome. The patient weighed I * 75 kg at birth, with a gestational age of 34 weeks. The infant was brought to the neonatal intensive care unit (ICU) immediately after birth because of respiratory distress, and was placed under an oxygen hood. Physical examination revealed the following characteristics, which provided the basis for the diagnosis: low set, malformed ears; overriding sutures; simian crease on one hand; clenched hands; overlapping of index finger over third finger and fifth finger over fourth; rocker-bottom feet; organomegaly; and a heart murmur. Further examination revealed an enlarged heart and confirmed a diagnosis of congenital heart defect. The infant was found to have an oesophageal atresia. A genetic consultation was requested in order to confirm the diagnosis. On physical examination the geneticist agreed with the diagnosis and recommended 'no life support.' Blood was drawn for a karyotype, the results of which normally take about a week to obtain.
The prognosis for infants with trisomy i8 is very poor. Thirty percent die within one month and 50 per cent by two months. The ten per cent which survive the first year are invariably severely mentally defective (i). Death is often sudden and unexplained, even after necropsy data are available. It has been suggested that the failure to thrive and death are due to a summation of anomalies, rather than to any specific one (2) . After Perhaps we would avoid confusion if we used the terms 'ethically indicated' and 'ethically nonindicated' in place of the terms 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary'. However, the latter terms are so firmly entrenched in medical discourse that it is doubtful that we shall abandon them in favor of the more precise alternative. Perhaps it will suffice to keep in mind the two ways in which we use the term 'ordinary'.
Given the diagnosis of trisomy i8, an argument can be made that even fluids and electrolytes constitute extraordinary treatment. Such treatment will only prolong the dying process, with the result of prolonging any suffering of the patient as well as the anguish of the parents. If this is true, then the treatment produces more harm than benefit. Thus, withholding F&E is justified on grounds of beneficence. However, a qualification is necessary in order to take account of consent. A judgment would have to be made about the abiliLy of the parents to deal with this aspect of the case. If they are able to contribute to the decision-making, then the decision to withhold all treatment should be discussed with them. Such a decision should ordinarily not be implemented if there are parental objections.
Active vs. passive Another distinction which requires careful articulation is that between active and passive involvement in the death of the patient. Passive involvement refers to the withholding or withdrawing of lifesupport measures with the result that the patient dies from a disease process which was present prior to the withholding or withdrawing of support. Active involvement refers to the initiation of a causal process which is distinguishable from any disease process which may have been present prior to the initiation of that causal process and which results in the patient's death. An example of the former would be withholding ventilatory support for a patient in respiratory distress, resulting in the death of the patient. The latter might be typified by the giving of a lethal injection of potassium chloride which results in cardiac standstill. It might be thought that the distinction between active and passive corresponds to the distinction between doing something and doing nothing. However, a couple of considerations show that this is not so. Turning off a ventilator, for example, in those cases in which doing so is indeed an instance of euthanasia, is referred to as passive euthanasia. Nevertheless, turning off a ventilator is doing something. Also, omitting a treatment, when intentional, is not really a case of doing nothing. The agent thereby performs a human action, even though it may be described negatively as withholding treatment. We refer to these as acts of omission.
One might object to the withholding of fluids and electrolytes in this case on the grounds that doing so initiates a causal process which would not otherwise exist. It might be argued that this would be an active involvement and that an active involvement in the death of a patient is never morally permissible. Two points can be made in reply. First, withholding F&E would not constitute an active involvement. Because the patient has an oesophageal atresia, she is not able to take fluids in the normal way by mouth. If treatment is withheld and the patient dies of dehydration, that death would be the result of a disease process. The specific disease is, of course, oesophageal atresia (5) . Second, a counter-example can be given for the statement that active involvement is always wrong. Consider a variation of the present case in which there is no atresia and in which, again, the parents do not want to have extraordinary treatment performed. In this case F&E would again be extraordinary treatment the withholding of which would be morally permissible, for the same reasons as discussed above. In this case, however, withholding F&E would be an active 
